Where is God when it hurts?

Julius von Bismarck

Many Christians and people who grow up in a predominately Christian culture learn from a young age to associate suffering and tragedy with sin. While these things can be related, they often aren't. Views linking sin and suffering are popularized each time a natural disaster occurs and some religious figure goes on TV blaming [enter fashionable vilified sin here]. Naturally, such teachings predispose people to look for someone or something to blame, whenever things go wrong. After all, “Someone must have done something to deserve this.” But occasionally, even for those with this mindset, the magnitude or seeming-randomness of a tragedy is so great that we are left to blindly grapple for ways of making sense of things. In such instances, it’s not uncommon for people to conclude that God allowed a hardship for purposes unseen or to teach some kind of lesson. Such cosmological/theological postulations have always bothered me, striking me as cruel, if true, but, more likely, as nonsensical and possibly “magical” thinking. What’s more, as a hospital chaplain and intern at a local parish, I’ve learned that many others share these struggles.   

Julius von Bismarck

Over the years, I have tried sorting through these matters, in hopes of making sense of how the world really works (and I still am!). I have taken notice of all the connected implications necessary for holding together a world view in which God directly authors such calamities. An example of this is, “how or whether God intervenes in the day-to-day affairs of our world and lives?” Also, “if God does intervene, how often and in what ways and for what reasons?” Making sense of such questions and how they relate to our overall conceptualization of God, creation, and what it means to be human, are at the very core of any discussion about the nature of suffering and evil. In his book, Raging with Compassion, theologian John Swinton wrestles with our framing of these perennial questions, as he seeks to formulate both a theologically orthodox and practically-based understanding of how humans experience suffering. He begins by posing the following thoughts, which I will use as spring board for my own exploration:  “Life is not fully comprehensible, controllable, or fixable. We constantly find ourselves as individuals, as communities, as nations, forced to live with unanswered questions. Where is God when it hurts?”[1]

Julius von Bismarck

When religious figures attribute blame to specific causes of their conjuring, they never do so in a vacuum. They do so from a perspective shaped by their own theological views and socially-derived perspective. For instance, a stereotypically liberal pastor might cite our nation’s involvement in a war or unjust economic practices as the underlying culprit, while their conservative counterpart might blame abortion or homosexuality. The philosophical trend of post-modernism has done wonders for increasing our capacity to critically self-reflect, resulting in the raising of our own awareness of the biases/assumptions we hold. At the heart of these attempts to assign blame lie our desires to uncover meaning and re-establish a sense of control. We think, “If I can just pinpoint what happened here, I can prevent it from happening to me (or repeating).” But as Swinton points out with the example of his neighbors’ eleven-year-old daughter, who suddenly and unexplainably dropped dead one afternoon on her way home from playing with friends, it is impossible to anticipate, make sense of, or assign blame with some tragedies.[2] Cases like these (and any number of other cruel happenings) are what inspire the so-called question of “Theodicy.” Theodicy refers to the problem of why a good and loving God, who is all-powerful, allows evil in the world. Or as David Hume so eloquently puts it:

“Is God willing to prevent evil, but not able? Then God is impotent. Is God able to prevent evil, but now willing? Then God is malevolent. Is God both willing and able to prevent evil? Then why is there any evil in the world.”[3]   

Swinton’s response to theodicy is to question our framing of things. He asserts that our present approach to such matters stem from post-Enlightenment assumptions of humanity’s ever ascending progress and its penchant for analyzing and breaking down problems, resulting in a world demystified.[4] In other words, our current perception that all problems are solvable (which he points out have only been reinforced be modern medical advances), leads us to conclude that all suffering, in and of itself, is evil that should be eradicated, whenever possible.[5] In times prior to the Enlightenment, Swinton says suffering was largely an accepted part of life, albeit no less painful. Rather than seeing it as a, “metaphysical problem needing a solution, [suffering was seen as] a practical challenge requiring a response.”[6] The relatively recent shift towards seeing suffering as surmountable has, according to Swinton, resulted in today’s philosophical conundrum of theodicy. Here, Swinton makes his most profound point, arguing that, “Theodicy should not be understood as a series of disembodied arguments designed to defend God’s love, goodness, and power.”[7] He sees modern, philosophical endeavors that engage these matters as guilty of mistakenly conjuring an “ahistorical, “free-floating,” abstracted notion of god. [8] Rather than conceiving of God as a specific entity, made known in the Christian religion, philosophers view God as an ontological challenge to be proven or disproven. Swinton’s point is significant because theodical endeavors necessarily involve cosmological concerns like the nature of evil and purpose of creation.   

Such connections become apparent when pondering specific tragedies, such as when a person is diagnosed with cancer or the aftermath of a hurricane. Traditionally, theologians speak of such destructive events by labeling them as “evils.” Classical theology then divides evils into two categories: moral evils, which are caused by human action or inaction and natural evils, which have nothing to do with humans, but happen as byproducts of the world simply being as it is.[9] In recent decades, making such distinctions has become ever more complex and blurred, as advances in science and medicine are taken into consideration. For instance, if a chronically depressed person suffering from a significant chemical imbalance commits suicide, was this a manifestation of moral evil or natural evil? Because so many problems can now be traced back to physiological factors, categorizing such occurrences can be tricky. Swinton’s response is to question the helpfulness of making such distinctions. Instead, he calls us to reconsider the relatively recent notion that all suffering is evil.[10]      

Importantly, Swinton reminds us of the classical Christian understanding that sees creation and the whole of existence as created, sustained, and loved by God. The brokenness of this world, which we experience as sin, tragedy, and suffering, are seen as unintended and therefore in need of fixing. Because God is loving and non-derelict Creator, Christians trust that God is reconciling the world back into wholeness, in accordance with God’s goodness and loving nature.[11] Herein lays the key to Christian hopefulness about the future—our sense, which if firmly tethered in scripture, that creation will one day be restored to its fullness. From this foundation, Swinton suggests that, although “Suffering is always tragic,” it needn’t necessarily always be considered evil.[12]

While some tragedies wrought by sinful wrongdoing can be labeled “evil” (think shooter at Virginia Tech, for instance), it’s much harder for many people today to call the shifting of tectonic plates (aka. an earthquake) evil. Seen in this light, such events, which often cause destruction and suffering on mass scales, are more accurately attributable to natural, scientifically understood processes. Similarly, when an elderly person dies from the natural, physical degeneration that takes place over time or a young woman experiences a miscarriage, such events, while not any less painful, are natural occurrences and therefore not evil. As such, for one to scrutinize these types of events expecting to uncover sin or wrongdoing as an underlying cause is to participate in a hunt for that which is not there (and potentially abuse the subject of such scrutiny). Now that I have accounted for what evil is not, let us move to consider what evil is.    

Swinton argues that natural events like earthquakes or even sudden, unexplainable, but medically possible deaths, while not inherently evil, can become so, if they evoke an insurmountable wedge between those suffering and their sense of meaning and hope. For Christians, meaning and hope come from their relationship with God, so experiences that take us from our ability to know God’s providential care and who we are as beloved creatures are evil.[13] To illustrate this, Swinton recalls a story of a 24 year-old woman who committed suicide after having endured a lifetime of sexual abuse by her father and brother.[14] The abuse she suffered resulted in her inability to see herself as a person of worth, dignity, or hope. Similarly, in cases where religious leaders scrutinize a person going through a painful, but natural hardship, when their efforts ultimately push that person away from their faith, one could view their interventions as evil. (Having experienced this firsthand and having met several patients through my work as a hospital chaplain who have undergone similar experiences, I can attest to the potential damage such theological views can inflict). The question remains then, “How, in such cases of natural suffering, can we make sense of such events, while leaving room for a God who still loves and providentially cares for this world?”

echoes of Job?

To begin to answer this, we must return to a foundational tenet of the Christian religion, which claims that the whole of creation is a product (or emanation) of God’s creative and boundless love. If we believe that God brought the cosmos into being, from nothing (ex nihilo), then everything exists by God’s will—even those parts that would be easy to overlook. Christians describe God’s love as principally within God, between the Three Persons of the Trinity (Father, Son, and Holy Spirit). Love, in this sense, is a mutual gifting/sharing of generative power. This love, therefore, is inherently relational in nature and applies to God’s relationship with creation. Similarly, as beings created in God’s image, we have a choice in whether or not to reciprocate God’s love. For us to have this capacity, an inbuilt vulnerability must exist within created order. We are free to reject God, after all. This vulnerability, when considered alongside the notion that humans are spiritual beings (made in God’s image), reveals the presence of a certain frailty and finitude that we exist within. Or as Swinton puts it, “Creation is fragile because it is underpinned by divine love.”[15]  

If we accept the above narrative and descriptions of evil and suffering, then our response becomes what is important. Swinton contends, “The problem with evil is not so much its existence, as our response to its existence.”[16] Furthermore, if we recognize that one can be party to evil, without knowingly participating (such as purchasing something derived by exploitative or ill-gotten means), then it becomes ones duty to try and root out such evils from one’s life. In other words, our response, as Christians, should be to resist evil in both its personal and systemic forms. When considering how to respond to suffering not caused by evil, we return to Swinton’s effort to ground the theodical conversation in particularity, namely the Christian conception of God. To do so, we look to God’s most visible revelation as seen in the person of Jesus Christ for illumination.[17] In Christ we find countless examples of standing against evil, in his bearing witness against injustices, his gift of presence with the suffering, and, ultimately, in his death on the cross. Jesus’ love was demonstrable, gratuitous, and undiscriminating. In his life, message, and deeds, we find a selfless giving, grounded in compassion and concern for the other. As followers of Christ, we see that even in cases of natural suffering, we are to respond with compassion, to strengthen such persons against loss of hope or meaning.

    

On the whole, Swinton’s response that we have misconstrued the whole theodical enterprise rings true enough, as I appreciate the room he leaves for mystery. The temptation to analyze and pin down every facet of the Universe is truly great, especially when involving something we perceive as a threat, but such endeavors are likely to prove disappointing in the end. For this reason, I concur with Swinton’s pragmatic, “What matters, is our response” outlook. Such a perspective does justice to the calling of Christians to live faithfully, without regard for our chances for success. In this sense, and after the likeness of our head, Christ Jesus, the Church, as a whole, is called to martyrdom. By this I mean we are to give our lives or give (gift) with our lives, rather than having them taken. As such, we should ask, “What beauty and moments thereof can we help to create/participate in?” Rather than acting in self-protective ways, pointing to the failures of others as a means for making ourselves feel safe and in control, we ought to live with aims of glorifying the One who makes all things possible. In this way, we can act with redemptive congruence to God’s own actions, helping to bring others into our story of hope and restorative healing.     

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[1] Swinton, John. Raging with Compassion: Pastoral Responses to the Problem of Evil, (Grand Rapids, William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2007), 3.

[2] Ibid, 9-10.

[3] David Hume, “Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding,” in Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, ed. Norman Kemp Smith (London: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1947), 66.

[4] John Swinton, Raging with Compassion, 32-33.

[5] Ibid, 39.

[6] Ibid, 35.

[7] Ibid, 4.

[8] Ibid, 40-41.

[9] Ibid, 50-51.

[10] Ibid, 52.

[11] Ibid, 53.

[12] Ibid, 52.

[13] Ibid, 59-60.

[14] Ibid, 61.

[15] Ibid, 66.

[16] Ibid, 48.

[17] Ibid, 67-68.